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"Moral hazard: Actions of economic agents maximizing their own
utility to the detriment of others, in situations where they do not
bear the full consequences or, equivalently, do not enjoy the full
benefits of their actions due to uncertainty and incomplete or
restricted contracts which prevent the assignment of full damages
(benefits) to the agent responsible."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the pop of the dot corn bubble at the turn of the twenty-
first century and its attendant recession, the Board of Governors Bank of
the United States reduced the federal funds rate eleven times in an effort
to stimulate economic growth.2 During this period, the United States real
estate market clearly emerged as the vehicle of choice to build wealth via
* J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Miami School of Law, BA, 2005, Rollins College.
Steve Allen, Institutional Background in Financial Risk Management, 8, httpV/www.math.nyu.edu'
fellows fin math/allen/institutrisklpdf
2 FEDERAL RESERVE, Open Market Operations, http'Avwwfederalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
openmarkethtm (last visited May 22,2011).
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speculation.3 Seeking to capitalize on the trend, major banks and mortgage
firms developed and sold a plethora of exotic mortgage products.4
Gradually, lending standards deteriorated as securitization seemingly
arose to replace their need.' Mortgages were milled to consumers,
creditworthy and non-creditworthy alike, and readily bundled and sold as
securities.' The thinking was that securitization would mitigate the risk
posed by lending to the non-creditworthy consumer.7 These asset backed
securities were sold as mortgage backed securities, included in
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), CDOs squared,9 and CDOs
cubed.1" It is estimated that over I trillion dollars of CDOs were issued
between 2004 and 2007.11
In response to massive exposure in the credit markets contingent on
the home buyers' ability to timely pay their mortgages, Wall Street firms
used yet another financial instrument - the credit default swap - to both
speculate and ameliorate risk.12 Through the use of credit default swaps 3
3 Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007- 2008: A Discussion of the Background, Market Reactions, and
Policy Responses, 90(5) FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 531,535 (2008).
4 Id.
5 See generally James D. Hamilton & Menzie Chinn, Deteriorating Lending Standards, ECONBROWSER
(Oct. 17, 2007), http/www.econbrowser.com/archives2007/l0deteriorafing_l.html (providing graphical
analysis depicting the declining lending standards throughout the housing boom).
6 Jason Cox et al., Why Did the Credit Cris Spread to Global Markets?, THE UNIV. OF IA. CTR. FOR
INT'L Fl. AND DEV. (Mar. 2010), httpVwww.uiowa.edufifdebook/ebook2/contents/part5-1I.shnl.
7 Id.
8 Collateralized Debt Obligation-CDO, INVESTOPED1A.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/c/cdo.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2011) ("An investment-grade security backed by a pool of bonds,
loans and other assets. CDOs do not specialize in one type of debt but are often non-mortgage loans
or bonds ... CDOs are unique in that they represent different types of debt and credit risk. In the
case of CDOs, these different types of debt are often referred to as 'tranches' or 'slices'. Each slice has
a different maturity and risk associated with it. The higher the risk, the more the CDO pays.").
9 Collateralized Debt Obligation Squared or CDO Squared, INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.investopedia.conVterms/c/cdo2.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2011) ("A special purpose vehicle
(SPV) with securitization payments in the form of tranches. A collateralized debt obligation squared
(CDO-squared) is backed by a pool of collateralized debt obligation (CDO) tranches.").
10 Collateralized Debt Obligation Cubed or CDO Cubed, INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo3.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2011) ("A special purpose vehicle
(SPV) with securitization payments in the form of tranches. Collateralized debt obligation cubeds
(CDO-cubeds) are backed by a pool of collateralized debt obligation squared (CDO-squared)
tranches.").
11 Cox et al., supra note 6.
12 Credit Default Swap Explained, ECONOMICS HELP (Nov. 11, 2008), httpV/Www.economicshelp.
org/blog/finance/credit-default-swaps-exlained/ [hereinafter CDS Explained].
13 Credit Default Swap (CDS), INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
creditdefaultswap.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2011) ("The buyer of a credit swap receives credit
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(CDS), banking firms were able to pay a quarterly premium to a
protection seller in exchange for the purchase of the underlying interest in
the asset by the protection seller in the event of default by the home
buyer.14 Naked default swaps allow parties without any interest in an asset
to buy similar contracts, which are simply bets that an unrelated party will
or will not default on their debt.'" The International Swaps and Derivative
Association reports that although the market for CDS in 2003 was $3.7
trillion, it grew to a notional value of $62.2 trillion (approximately four
times gross domestic product of the U.S.) in 2007 before that amount fell
to $38.6 trillion in 2008.16 CNBCjournalist, David Faber, reported on the
development of the many opportunities built upon U.S. mortgages and
described the resulting configuration as a house of cards. 7 The
observation, however astute for its recognition of that structure's
proclivity to collapse, is upside down. The more apt symbolic image is an
inverted pyramid, vast and unwieldy at the top, ill-conceived at its base,
and doomed to collapse from the start.
Inevitably, prices in the housing market began to decline, and by 2007
many of the firms directly exposed to the subprime mortgage market filed
for bankruptcy as defaults on the riskiest mortgages mounted. 8
Securitization of subprime mortgages virtually ceased, and by mid-2007
ratings agencies began downgrading the securities backed by risk-prone
mortgages. 9 The downgrades sent shockwaves through the entire
financial system. 2' The tip of the inverted pyramid evaporated, and
everything built upon it collapsed.2'
protection, whereas the seller of the swap guarantees the credit worthiness of the product. By doing
this, the risk of default is transferred from the holder of the fixed income security to the seller of the
swap.').
14 CDS Fxplained, supra note 12.
15 Dawn Kopecki & Shannon D. Harrington, Banning 'Naked' Default Swaps May Raise Corporate
Funding Costs, BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2009), htplf/Avww.bloomberg.con/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aOWlVTiv9q2A.
16 INT'L SWAPS AND DERATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC. (2010), httpVAww.isda.org/statistics/
pdf/ISDA-Market-Survey-historical-data.pdf
17 David Faber, House of Cards, CNBC, httpVAvww.cnbc.corn/id/28892719/ (last visited May 22,
2011).
18 The Financial Cnsis: A Timeline of Events and Policy Aaions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
http//timeline.sdouisfed.org/indexcfrnp=timeline# (last visited May22 2011) [hereinafter Timeline].
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Paul Jackson, S&P Cuts Four Major Mortgage Insurers; Projects Worsening Housing
Slump, HOUSINGWIRE (Apr. 8, 2008, 7:57 PM), http//www.housingwire.com/2008/04/08/s-projects-
worsening-housing-slump (quoting credit analyst James Brender at Standard & Poor's, "[tihe
deterioration in the housing markets has also been worse than our expectations. Now, we believe
2011]
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In 2008, as a result of the faulty understanding of risk and
securitization, no one on Wall Street - or anywhere else - was adequately
assessing the threat posed by counterparty risk.' The extreme opacity in
the CDS market and the realization by major financial institutions of
faulty risk assessment froze interbank lending.' In what amounted to a
game of high-stakes musical chairs, firms were stuck with whatever
holdings they had in their possession.24  Ultimately, Wall Street
investment vehicles had encouraged a metamorphosis of the subprime
crisis into a global financial crisis.25
The extent of the damage became public as staple investment houses
failed, and others were absorbed by larger institutions.26 In an effort to
unfreeze credit and prevent a collapse of the entire global financial system,
the Board of Governors and U.S. Treasury requested $700 billion to
purchase bad loans off the ailing firms' balance sheets. 27 The Treasury
and Board of Governors defended the Wall Street bailout over calls to
allow the market to correct itself, and argued that many firms are "too big
to fail" without creating a global market collapse. 28 On October 3, 2008,
the Wall Street bailout was approved by Congress, causing the public
collective psychic pain. 29
When the immediate threat of global economic failure had subsided
and panic was no longer hanging in the halls of the Capitol, the 110th
Congress undertook to reign in Wall Street's new innovations, while
seeking to prevent future financial crises.30  As ideological forces
median home prices will decline 20 percent from the peak in 2006.").
21 See Thndiem, supra note 18.
22 See, e.g., Craig Torres, U.S. Bank Regulators Issue Guidance On Conterparty Risk Management,
BLOOMBERG (July 5, 2011 10:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.conx/news/2011-07-05/u-s-bank-
regulators-issue-guidance-on-counterparty-credit-risk.html ("The Federal Reserve, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift
Supervision said today the financial crisis of 2007-2009 'revealed weaknesses' in counterparty credit
risk management 'at many banking organizations.' The regulators pointed to the 'shortcomings' in the
ability of banks to determine exposures in a timely way, and noted "poor selection" of counterparty
credit risk metrics.").
23 Id.
24 Mizen, supra note 3, at 544.
25 Seegeneraly id.
26 Tunline, supra note 18.
27 See Joe Nocera, Lehman Had to Die So Global Finance Could Live, N.Y. TIMES (Sept 11, 2009),
httpVvww.nytimes.coznV2009/09/12Vbusiness/l2nocera.html?r 1&ref=businessspecial4.
28 Timne, supra note 18.
2 Id.
30 Brady Dennis, Congress Pas Financal Reform Bill, WASHINGTON POST (July 16, 2010),
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attempted to frame the future of the American financial economy, the
monumental legislation was forged amidst claims of legislative capture,
anti-competitiveness, and anti-Americanism.31 Underlying the incendiary
environment was a multi-faceted battle between free-marketeers, seeking
to limit the sweep of the impending regulation, those who sought greater
regulation to reduce the likelihood of future market failures, those that
wanted to dismantle the "too big to fail" banks and bring them down to
size, and innumerable combinations of the above.32 Regardless of each
member's view on financial regulation, Congress had to make a policy
decision central to the "too big to fail" paradigm: Should the "too big to
fail" banks be broken?
33
On the one hand, massive banking institutions within the "too big to
fail" category have achieved incredible economies of scale.34 As a result,
each is able to offer the consumer high quality banking services globally,
conveniently, and less expensively than smaller institutions.3"
Additionally, it is argued that many large non-financial institutions require
banking services which can only be provided by the largest banks.36 There
is also speculation that the largest firms are more stable than many of the
smaller firms because the smaller firms have less diverse holdings to
support themselves when one revenue stream is threatened, which may
result in future bailouts.3' Each of these views is undergirded by the belief
http-Avwwwashingtonpostcorp/wpyncontent/article/2010 7/15/AR2010071500464.hn.
31 See, e.g., Jim Puzzanhera, Dispute Oer Proposed Financial Regulations Escalates, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Mar. 24, 2010), http;//ardcles.chicagotibuneconVm2010-03-24/new-ssc-biz-0325-chamber-
20100324_1_financial-regulations-wolin-chamber-conference (reporting on a speech by Deputy Secretary
Neal Wolin's to the Chamber of Commerce in which he accused the Chamber of deceit in their advertising
against financial reform).
32 See Dean Baker, Why We Must Break up the Banks, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2010, 5:30 PM BST),
http/vw.guardian.co.uk/conmmenfreecifamerict20O/apr/07/paul-krngman-break-up -banks.
33 See, e.g., Letter from Brad Miller et al., Representative from the 13th District, North Carolina, to
Members of Congress, (Apr. 29,2010), http'/georgewashington2.blogspotconv2010/4/congressman-miller-
introduces-bill.html (seeking co-sponsors for "The Safe, Accountable, Fair and Efficient Banking Act of
2010," which proposes strict caps on total deposits among a host of other measures).
34 Felix Salmon, The Too-Big-to-Fail Debate Continues, SEEKING ALPHA (Nov. 16, 2009),
http;//seekingalpha.com/article/173539-the-too-big-to-fail-debate-continues.
35 Id.
36 See Roger Lowensteinjamie Dimon: America's Least-Hated Banker, NY T VI MAGAZINE (Dec. 1,
2010), http' Avw&.nytimes-coM/01125magane5Dimon-thtml?adxn = Wpagewanted =all.&
adxnnlx= 1313366622-iA4QmuTMw5oDpCm4AHwvzA.
37 Shahien Nasiripour, Larry Summers Defends Megabanks, Says Too Many Small Banks Make
U.S. 'Less Stable,' HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 23, 2010, 2:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/04/23Aarry-summers-defends-meg.n_549574.html (quoting Larry Summers, Chief Economic
Advisor to President Obama as saying, "[Observers] believe that it would actually make us less stable,
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that "too big to fail" is not linked to size, but instead to risk profiles and
financial relationships.3"
On the other hand, when a "too big to fail" bank is on the precipice of
collapse, history demonstrates conclusively that the taxpayer will foot the
bill to save the institution.3 9 Supporters of limiting the size of banks posit
that in spite of the convenience and savings the largest banks offer, banks
that control such a vast swath of market share, where their failure
threatens the global financial system, should be limited to whatever size
allows their failure to be conceivable.' These supporters argue that failing
to break the "too big to fail" banks is tantamount to an implicit
governmental guarantee of future bailouts.41 Under this view, only the
risk of failure will preserve rational incentive structures and prevent
mega-banks from taking excessive risks.4" Additionally, they argue that
capping the size of banks assists in disentangling the systemic banks from
the political process, reducing their ability to influence legislation and
regulation.43
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
44
(Dodd-Frank) was signed into law July 21, 2010 and reflected Congress
and the Administration's belief that it was not the size of the banks that
was central to addressing the "too big to fail" paradigm. 45 Adopting the
because the individual banks would be less diversified and, therefore, at greater risk of failing, because
they would haven't profits in one area to turn to when a different area got in trouble... [A]nd most
observers believe that dealing with the simultaneous failure of many -- many small institutions would
actually generate more need for bailouts and reliance on taxpayers than the current economic
environment.").
38 Chen Zhou, Are Banks Too B!g to Fail? Measuring Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, 205
INT'L J. CENTRAL BANKING 206 (2010) ("Recently, both policymakers and academicians have begun to
distinguish the size of a [nancial institution from the systemic importance it has by introducing new terms
focusing on what the potential systemic impact might be if that particular institution fails. For example,
Bernanke addresses the problem of[Jnancial institutions that are deemed "too interconnected to fail"; Rajan
uses the term "too systemic to fail" to set the central focus of new regulation development This urges the
design of alternative measures on systemic importance.").
39 For a useful graphical representation of the history of economic intervention in the United States,
see History of U.S. Gov't Bailouts, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 15, 2009, 12:02 PM), httpV/www.propublica.org/
specia/government-bailouts.
40 Baker, supra note 32.
41 See id.
42 See Steve Verdon, It's the Incentives, Stupid, OursIDE THE BELTWAY (Mar. 11, 2009),
http/Avww.outsidethebeltway.cormitsithe incentivesstupid-2/.
43 SIMONJOHNSON &JAMES KWA^, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEcr
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 6(2010).
44 Dodd-FrankWall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. SS 5301-5641 (2010).
45 See id. §S 5311- 5374.
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view that a regulation-only approach is viable, Dodd-Frank's 848 pages are
dedicated to the reconfiguration and further empowerment of existing
federal financial regulatory entities.' Consistent with that view, Dodd-
Frank unites the existing federal financial regulators by statutory decree in
the Financial Stability Oversight Council to protect the public from
future market failures.47
In Section II, this note provides the historical context which
ultimately led to the creation and enactment of Dodd-Frank. Next,
Section III describes the provisions of the Act most likely to affect the
operations of banks with operations in the United States. Section IV
asserts that Dodd-Frank cannot fulfill its stated legislative purpose of
ending "too big to fail" without reducing the size of the current "too big
to fail" banks. Finally, Section V argues that where Congress attempted to
address "too big to fail" without capping the size of the banks, it likely
delegated too much of its power to the financial regulatory state to remain
within the constitutionally defined parameters of federalism.
II. BAILOUT FATIGUE
A. The Continental Illinois Saga
It is useful to understand the modern tensions that developed
surrounding systemic bank regulation when failure was imminent to
acquire some understanding of what caused Congress to birth a statutory
behemoth with an eye toward preventing "too big to fail." Prior to 2008
and the failures of IndyMac48 and Washington Mutual,4 9 the Continental
Illinois bank failure of 1984 sat comfortably atop the list of largest banking
failures in U.S. history, and it quickly became emblematic of the "too big
to fail" paradigm.50 In addition, the collapse illuminated an ideological
46 See d.
47 Id.
48 Due to liquidity problems arising frm risky subprime loans, "IndyMac Bancorp Inc. became the
second-biggest federally insured financial company to be seized by U.S. regulators after a run by depositors left
the California mortgage lender short on cash." Ari Levi, IndyMac Seized by US. Regudators; Sdumer Blamed for
Failure, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2008), http;Avww.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchivecsid=
aAYLeK3YAie4.
49 Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Govemment Seizes WaMu and Sels SomeAssets, N.Y TIMES, Sept.
25, 2008, http//vww.nytimes.com2(8/(0926/busi u.html ( "[I 1n what was by far the largest bank
failure in American history ... [riegulators simultaneously brokered an emergency sale of virtually all of
Washington Mutual, the nation's largest savings and loan, to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 billion.").
50 Richard J. Herring, The Collapse of Continental Illinois National Bank And Trust Company: The
2011]
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regulatory chasm between advocates of market capitalism and those who
preferred governmental interventionism 51 Beginning in the mid-1970's,
the banking firm Continental Illinois (CINB) embarked on a growth
strategy, whereby the firm focused on expanding its lending portfolio
heavily in the energy sector and implemented an aggressive pricing
model.5 2 The strategy was a staggering short-term success. Between 1976
and 1981, the bank increased its commercial and industrial lending 180%
from $5 billion to $14 billion, while increasing its total assets 110% to $45
billion from $21.5 billion.5 3 During this period, CINB outgrew most of
its peers in the top ten largest U.S. banks.54
Equity analysts were beholden by the Enron-esque ascent of CINB
and their rapture was understandable - CINB was realizing return on
equity at 14.35%, second only to Morgan Guaranty among its
competitors.55 CINB's stock price reflected the market's adoration
doubling from $13 to $27 by 1979.56 But, like the prince of Morocco, the
markets required reminding that "all that glisters is not gold."
5 7
Implications For Risk Management and Regulation, 2, httpv/fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/case%20studies/
continental%20fu1l.pdf
s Alan Greenspan stated "I don't think merely raising the fees or capital on large institutions or
taxing them is enough. I think they'll absorb that, they'll work with that, and it's totally inefficient and they'll
still be using the savings." Carolyn Austin, Heavywighs Debate 'Too Bjg to Fal," WALL ST. CHEAT SHEET
(Nov. 30, 2009), httpV/wallstcheatsheet.com/breaking-news/heavy-weights-debate-too-big-to-faiVl?p=4194/.
The head of the Bank of England, Mervyn King proclaimed, "[t]he belief that appropriate regulation can
ensure that speculative activities do not result in failures is a delusion." Id. On the other hand, Ben Bernanke
and Paul Krugrnan noted, "[w]e can address these issues in a way that doesn't destroy the economic value of
large, complex multifunction firms through other mechanisms." Id.
52 FED. DEPosIr INS. CORP., His1'ORY OF THE 80s: VOL I, AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING
CRISES OF THE 1980s AND EARLY 1990s, ch. 7 CONTINENTAL ILL[NOIS AND "Too BIG TO FAIL", at 240
(1997), available at httpv/www.fdic.gov/banWhistoricaVhistory/235_258.pdf [hereinafter CONTINENTAL
ILINOIS] (describing in considerable detail the events surrounding the crisis of the Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust Company).
53 Id. at 237.
54 Case Study: Continntal /inois, SUNGARD AMBrr EISK (Nov. 2002), http;vww.eriskcorrf
leaming/CaseStudies/Continentallllinois.asp#STORY [hereinafter Case Study].
55 CONTINENTAL ILLINOiS, supra note 52, at 238.
56 Id. at 237.
57 WILL M SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 7 (M.M. Mahood, ed.,
Cambridge University Press 1987) (1596-98) ("All that glisters is not gold; Often have you heard this told:
Many a man his life hath sold; But my outside to behold: Gilded tombs do worms enfold. Had you been as
wise as bold, Young in limbs, injudgment old, Your answer had not ben inscroll'd: Fare you well; your suit is
cold. Cold, indeed; and labor lost- Then farewell, hear, and welcome, frost! Portia adieu. I have too grieved a
heart. To take a tedious leave: thus losers part").
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By 1981, the upward trend in energy prices had reversed, and the
catalyst of CINB's growth became the albatross around its neck. 8 In
calamitous succession, CINB's debtors defaulted, $1 billion dollars was
lost in speculative oil and gas ventures, and the less-developed-country
debt crisis, where CINB was a major player, led to a run on the bank in
1984.59  When a multi-billion dollar private loan deal orchestrated by
CINB's management failed to stabilize matters, it became clear that some
form of government intervention would be necessary to prevent
collapse. 6°
Although the FDIC had three options available,61 the organization
only considered one realistic - guaranteeing all of CINB's debt, while the
Board of Governors provided liquidity to support operational costs. 62 AS
part of the deal, the FDIC purchased an 80% interest in CINB via
preferred shares.63 Effectively, only those parties with an equity interest in
CINB took a haircut, while debt holders and depositors walked away.64
This action led to serious questions regarding moral hazard,
nationalization, and competitive unfairness.
65
The regulatory community considered CINB "too big to fail" and, by
implication, the policy held for all of the major banking players. 66 In
response to the CINB episode, Congress granted regulators greater
flexibility to deal with large bank failures, including the addition of
bridge-bank67 authority.68 Otherwise, the problems presented by "too big
58 See CONTINENTAL ILuNOIS, supra note 52.
59 Case Study, supra note 54.
60 Id.
61 CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS, supra note 52, at 248.
62 Id. at 244.
63 Case Study, supra note 54.
6 Id. In the aftermath, the Comptroller of the Currency, Todd Conover, stated, "[w]e
debated at some length how to handle the situation. In our collective judgment, had Continental
failed and been treated in a way in which depositors and creditors were not made whole, we could
very well have seen a national, if not international, financial crisis the dimensions of which were
difficult to imagine. None of us wanted to find out."
65 CONTINENTAL ILUNOIS, supra note 52, at 247-48.
66 Id.
67 FED. DEPOSrr INs. CORP. INDus. ANALYSIS Div., MANAGING THE CRIsIs: THE FDIC AND
RTC EXPERIENCE, ch. 6 BRIDGE BANKs, 171 (2005), available at httpV/vww.fdic.gov/bankhistoricaV
managing/historyl-06.pdf ("A bridge bank is a temporary national bank chartered by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and organized by the FDIC to take over and maintain banking services
for the customers of a failed bank. It is designed to 'bridge' the gap between the failure of a bank and the time
when the FDIC can implement a satisfactory acquisition by a third party.").
68 CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS, supra note 52, at 254; see Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA) of
1987,12 U.S.C. § 1821 (2007).
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to fail" banking institutions went unaddressed by specific legislation.
69
Despite knowledge that systemic risk remained acute in big banks,
regulators viewed subsequent denials of bailouts as a sign "too big to fail"
may have been addressed.7
B. The Invisible Hand Falls Asleep
In response to the dot corn bubble and the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, Board of Governors Chairman Alan Greenspan
embarked on an aggressive and extended period of low short-term interest
rate policies meant to encourage lending.71  Meanwhile, savings rates
declined internationally, as nations moved to purchase U.S. Treasury
bonds in an effort to establish foreign currency reserves as a buffer against
domestic financial turmoil.72 The high demand in U.S. Treasury notes
abroad had the effect of reducing long-term interest rates in the United
States.73
Although widely acknowledged to be an unsustainable arrangement,
the trend nonetheless encouraged credit growth in the domestic United
States, English, and Canadian marketplaces.74 Greater access to credit led
to greater household spending on revolving credit and further reductions
in savings. v" The expansion in credit also allowed housing prices to
outstrip incomes as home buyers, speculating that housing prices would
69 See CONTINENTAL ILLINoIs, supra note 52, at 254.
70 See id. ("Moreover, without addressing TBTF directly, by the late 1980's regulators were no
longer, in L.William Seidman's words, 'as solicitous of the interests of the bank's owners and bondholders: as
they had been in the case of Continental.' This changed policy had partly evolved by the time of the First City
Bancorporation assistance in 1988, and was clearly evident in the case of First Republic, also in 1988, when
FDIC money was channeled directly into the banking subsidiaries and not into the holding company.").
71 Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007-2008: A Discussion of the Background, Market Reactions, and
Polity Responses, 90(5) FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 531,533 (2008).
72 Id. at 534.
73 Id.; see Susan Lee, It Really is All Gremspan's Fault, FORBES Apr. 3, 2009, httpV/www.forbes.
com(2'T9/e4/O2/greenspan-john-taylor-fed-rates-china-opinions-columnists-housing-bubble.htmI (-The
Greenspan loose policy went on to fuel a boom, while the Taylor Tight would have avoided one. As Taylor
says, all the Fed needed to do was follow 'the kind of policy that had worked well during the period of
economic stability called the Great Moderation, which began in the early 1980's.' The connection between
Greenspan loose and the housing boom is also clear.").
74 Mitzen, supra note 29, at 534.
75 The U.S. saving ratio fell from 6 percent of disposable income to below 1 percent over the course
of the previous decade. Additionally, the total debt to disposable-income ratio rose to 120% from 75%. Id. at
534.
2011] DODD-FRANK SIMPLER
continue to rise, took on unaffordable loans.76  Recognizing an
opportunity to profit, lenders began increasing the volume of "subprime
mortgage"7  offerings.7  The increase in originations was largely
attributable to the appetite of investors for mortgage backed securities and
CDO's, which required new mortgages as a portion of their underlying
assets.79 By 2006, the risk presented by the subprime mortgages became
clear.80 Moreover, it became evident that the process of pooling the
mortgages into securitized assets did not necessarily mitigate those risks."s
As default rates increased, the repercussions of excessive subprime lending
became highly visible. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
announced that it would no longer purchase the risky notes and related
securities.82 Soon after, major subprime lenders slipped into default and
sought bankruptcy protection and, as a result, mortgage backed securities
were down-graded by all of the major credit rating agencies.8 3 As demand
76 See David M. Walker, The Larger Subprime Challenge, PoLIrco (Mar. 31, 2008, 9:36 PM),
httpV/www.politico.com/news/stories/0308/9283.htl. ("The current mortgage disruption evolved from
homebuyers speculating that real estate prices would continue to rise and interest rates would stay low. Too
many mortgage loan transactions were based on the assumed value of a home rather than the creditworthiness
of the borrower. As a result, many of the loans that were made did not pass the 'straight-face test' of a
considered evaluation of the ability of the borrower to pay and the related credit risks.").
77 The Financial Crisis: A Timeline of Events and Polity Actions (Glossaty), FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST.
LoUis, httpV/timeline.stlouisfed.org/indexzcfn?p=glossary (last visited Mar. 29,2011) [hereinafter Timeline]
(defining Subprime Mortgage Loan: "The classification 'subprime' generally is a lender-given designation for
loans extended to borrowers with some sort of credit impairment, say, due to missing installment payments
on debt or the lack of a credit history. Along with an individual's credit rating, characteristics of the mortgage
loan can contribute to a lender classifying a loan as subprime-features such as limited or no documentation
about income or assets, high loan-to-value ratios or high payment-to-income ratios. Subprime loans typically
have a FICO credit score of 620 or less.").
78 Inside Mortgage Finance asserts that subprime mortgage originations grew approximately $400
billion between 2001 and 2005. Mizen, supra note 29, at 536.
79 See Thomas Adams & Yves Smith, CDO Market: Rie Wih Collusion and Manipulation?, NAKED
CAPrTAISM (Apr. 23, 2010), http'/www.nakedcapitalism.comi2010/04/cdo-market-%E2%80/ 93-rife-with-
collusion-and-manipulation.htnl. ("CDO's distorted the mortgage market because they undermined the
normal processes for pricing risky assets. For subprime debt, demand for the lower rated tranches had served
to constrain market growth. If investors started to shun the BBB to AA rated tranches of subprime mortgage
bonds, dealers were not willing to retain them, no new deals would be sold, and the market would need to
find better quality mortgages or grind to a halt. But CDO's were the dumping ground for these tranches.").
80 See Mizen, supra note 29, at 535.
81 Jason Cox et al., Wty Did the Credit Crisis Spread to Global Markets?, THE UNIV. OF IA CTR. FOR
INT'L FIN. AND DEv. (Mar. 2010), httpV//ww.uiowa.edufdebook/ebook2/cotents/part-II.shtml.
82 Timeline, supra note 35.
a3 Testimony of Vwkie A Tilman, Standard & Poor's Credit Market Senices: Hearing Before the Subcommittee
On Capital Markets, Insurance And Government Sponsored Enterprises United States House of Representatives, 110th
Cong. 21 (2007), available at httpV/financialservices.house.gov/hearingl 10/tillman.pdf.
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for the securities shrank in response to the downgrades, premier securities
firms wound down hedge funds specializing in the MBS/CDO niche, or
declared the funds bankrupt.'
The good-time fog burned away under the bright, unrelenting light of
depreciation in the real estate market and, in response, major financial
players took an immediate defensive strategy, signaling the onset of a
"Minsky moment."" The widespread loss mitigation and containment
strategies of financial firms across the economic spectrum immediately
stranded those firms over-exposed to the MBS and CDO market.8 6 Bear
Stearns, which survived the depression of 1929, immediately fell victim
and was forced to merge into JP Morgan Chase in a deal brokered by the
Board of Governors Bank of New York. 7 Soon thereafter, Lehman
Brothers, another Wall Street icon, was allowed to collapse8 amidst a
chorus of ballyhoos that the Treasury and Board of Governors were
playing favorites.89
Despite the moral hazard concerns, head of the Treasury, Henry
Paulson, pressed Congress for approval to take radical action.' With the
looming threat that the Lehman collapse had destabilized the financial
viability of other even larger banks, Congress, on October 3, 2008,
enacted House Resolution 1424, which established the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP).9' Just as the FDIC and Board of Governors
attempted to take the toxic energy holdings off of the CINB balance sheet
84 Citi May Have a New Mess On Its Hands, BLOOMBERG BUSNE.SSWEEK, Nov. 12, 2007,
h ttp/Avww.businesswee]Lcom/magazine/content/)7_46lb4058049.htm.
95 Charles Whalen, The U.S. Credit Crunch of2OO7A Minsky Moment, THE MARKET ORACLE (Nov.
13, 2007, 12:04 PM), httpV//www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article2751.hml. ("[A] prolonged period of rapid
acceleration of debt" in which more traditional and benign borrowing is steadily replaced by borrowing that
depends on new debt to repay existing loans. Then the "moment" occurs, "when lenders become increasingly
cautious or restrictive, and when it isn't only overleveraged structures that encounter financing difficulties. At
this juncture, the risks of systemic economic contraction and asset depreciation become all too vivid."); Justin
Lahart, In Time of Tumul Obscure Economist Gains Curreny, WALL ST.J., Aug. 18, 2007, http/online.wsj.con/
public/article/SB 1 18736585456901047.html.
86 David Enke, Merrill Lynch's Counterparty Risk, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 17, 2008),
http-/seekigalpha.cot/article/72787-merri-lynch-s-counterpartyrisk
97 See No Picnic: JP Morgan Chase Quintuples Bid For Its Rival. Now For the Hard Part, THE
ECONOMIST, Mar. 27,2008, httpV/www.economist.com/node/10926298.
s8 Jim Puzzanghera, Ex-Lehman CEO Blames Government for Finn's Collapse, LA TIMES, Sept. 2,
2010, http/articles.htimes.corV2010/sep/02/business/la-fi-crisis-inquiry-20100902.
89 See Nocera, supra note 7.
90 Henry Paulson, Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, N.Y TIMES, Sept 20, 2008,
http;//ww.nytimes.com200W09/21/businesdraftd.html? r=2&ref=business.
91 H.R Res. 1424, 110th Cong (2008) (enacted).
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in 1984, TARP was meant to remove toxic assets from balance sheets of
the entire financial industry.92 TARP's implementation marked an
exhumation of "too big to fail" in American banking regulatory discourse,
and the beginning of a populist political backlash which birthed TARP's
derisive sobriquet, "bailout."
Transactions under the plan fell into four broad categories: capital
purchases and repayments, additional support for large financial
institutions, financial assistance to automakers and related businesses, and
other.93 Among the highest profile assistance packages were those offered
to international bank Citigroup and American Insurance Group (AIG).
The Citigroup bailout was structured so that the bank initially received
$25 billion through the Capital Purchase Program94 and another $20
billion through the Treasury's Targeted Investment Program. 95  In
addition, the Treasury agreed to absorb up to $5 billion in losses that
could result from the federal guarantee of a pool of $301 billion of
Citigroup's assets. 96
Although AIG initially received support from the Board of Governors,
TARP accounted for a $40 billion purchase of preferred stock by the
Treasury, followed by a $30 billion line of credit.9" Both the bailout of
AIG, a non-banking entity, and the subsequent bailout of the American
automakers98 were justified under the banner of "too big to fail."' Public
disapproval of the bailout soared, and the policy of "too big to fail" became
the object of great public scorn.1 °0
Congress began crafting an overhaul of the regulatory framework for
the entire financial sector to address concerns of structural deficiencies in
the financial regulatory scheme.10 1 Although many objectives informed
92 Id. at § 101(a)(1).
93 Avi Lerner, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CBO 4112, Report on the Troubled Asset
Relief Program, March 2010, available at httpVAww.scribd.coddoc/28527535/CBO-TARP-Report-March-
2010.
94 Press Release, U.S. DEPT OF TREASURY, Treasury Announces Participation in Citigroup's
Exchange Offering (Feb. 27, 2009), httpsV/ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg41.htrm
95 Id.
9 Lemer, supra note 52, at 4.
97 Id.
98 See Lucian Bebchuk, AIG Still Isn't Too B g to Fail, WAL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2009,
httpV/online.wsj.con/article/SB123751263240591203.html.
99 See Chris Nelder, The Big Three "Stidz-Up". Bailing Out the Automakers is Stepping Backwards,
ENERGY&CAPrrAL (Nov. 19,2008), http'/www.energyandcapital.cor/articles/big-three-bailout/786.
100 Seegeneraly www.nobailout.org (last visited Apr. 8, 2011); www.votenobailoutorg (last visited Apr.
8, 2011); www. nowallstreetbailout.com (last visited Apr. 8, 2011).
101 G. Michael O'Leary et al., Obama Administration Announces Financial Regulatory Otdiaul, ANDREWS
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the creation of the legislation, a centerpiece of Congress' concerns was
addressing "too big to fail." 02 The endeavor yielded the Dodd-Frank Act,
named after its Senate and House sponsors, and included vast rulemaking
authority assigned to the regulatory community.
10 3
III. DODD-FRANK SIMPLER
A. Title I: The Financial Stability Oversight Council
Central to the Dodd-Frank legislation is the creation of the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). 1° 4 A virtual regulatory pyramidion,
the FSOC is a committee comprised of existing regulatory directors and
appointed officials charged with monitoring systemic risk across the
country.' In an effort to ensure the Council's success, Congress
dropped a few arrows in the Council's quiver. Indeed, once identified by
the FSOC as a systemic financial entity, a banking firm may enter into an
entirely new regulatory paradigm requiring the firm to: comply with
heightened prudential standards,0 6 maintain a living will,0 7 participate in
annual stress tests at the behest of the Board of Governors,' develop
approved early remediation strategies,109and restrict merger and
acquisition activities."0 Each of the foregoing tools at the FSOC's
disposal is discussed below.
KURTHATPYs LLP (June 24,2009), httpV/www.andrewskurth.cormpressroom-publications-641.
102 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. S 5301-5641 (2010)
("An act to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in
the financial system, to end 'too big to fail,' to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect
consumers fiom abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.").
103 See id.
104 Id. S 5321(a).
105 The FSOC will be comprised often voting members: the secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of
the Board of Governors, Comptroller of the Currency, Director of the Bureaus of Consumer Financial
Protection, Chairperson of the SEC, Chairperson of the FDIC, Chairperson of the CFTC, Director of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board, and an
independent member appointed by the President whose term is 6 years. The five non-voting members are:
Director of the Officer of Financial Research, Director of the Federal Insurance Office, a state insurance
commissioner, a state banking supervisor, a state securities commissioner. Id. S 5321(b).
106 Generally declaring that the FSOC is to "give due regard to the principle[s] of national treatment
and equality of competitive opportunity" in addition to considering the extent to which the foreign bank is
regulated domestically. M S 5325(b)(2).
107 See id. S 5325(b)(1)(D)
108 Id. S 5365(i)(1)(A) (2010).
109 Id. § 5366(c).
115 Id. S 5331(a)(1).
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The identification of systemically important firms falls primarily
within the domain of the FSOC."' Beyond this designation, the council
serves to advise existing regulatory bodies - for the purposes of foreign
banks the Board of Governors - on what measures should be taken to
mitigate risk."' The Act vests in the Board of Governors the authority to
promulgate exemptions from a systemic importance designation."3
However, the Act specifies that firms with consolidated assets exceeding
$50 billion come immediately within the ambit of the FSOC reporting
requirements, the Act's leverage limits and, thus, imminently closer to a
systemic importance designation." 4 The impact of such designation is not
insignificant.
At the discretion of the Board of Governors, a systemic bank may be
required to meet heightened prudential standards."' The measures that
fall under this banner include more stringent risk-based and contingent
capital requirements, leverage limits, liquidity requirements, resolution
plan and credit exposure report requirements, concentration limits,
disclosure rules, short-term debt limits, and overall risk management
requirements.16 Uniformity of application of these standards is not
required by the Act and, therefore, application of the heightened
prudential standards will be tailored to each institution." 7 The FSOC's
ability to monitor individual institutions in this capacity is enhanced by
the creation of the Office of Financial Research (OFR),"8 which is
granted the authority to request information from a litany of financial
institutions,"' including foreign bank subsidiaries. 2 °
Insofar as the Board of Governors and FSOC determine that more
stringent capital and liquidity requirements should be imposed on a
il Id. S 5322(a)(1)(A).
112 Id.§5323.
113 Id. S 5365(k)(2).
114 Id. S 5326(a).
115 Id. S 5325.
116 Id. S 5325(b)(1).
117 Id. S 5365(a)(2)(a).
118 Id. § 5342.
119 Id. § 5343.
120 Id. S 5311(a)(1) ("A foreign bank or company that is treated as a bank holding company for
purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, pursuant to 3106(a) of this title, shall be treated as a
bank holding company for purposes of this subchapter."); see aLso 12 U.S.C. S 3106(a) ("Except as otherwise
provided in this section (1) any foreign bank that maintains a branch or agency in a State, (2) any foreign bank
or foreign company controlling a foreign bank that controls a commercial lending company organized under
State law, and (3) any company of which any foreign bank or company referred to in (1) and (2) is a subsidiary
shall be subject to the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.").
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systemic foreign bank, the "Basel III" standards are likely to serve as the
basis for whatever heightened requirements are settled upon.121 Basel III
further restricts which assets qualify as Tier 1 capital, while requiring
banks to maintain minimum common equity of seven percent.122 It
further enables enforcement of counter-cyclical buffers of 2.5% in times
of expanding access to credit."z Generally, the new banking standards will
require banks to maintain more assets relative to what they loan and
invest, while restricting what types of assets count toward the Tier 1
requirements.12 4  The G20 formally endorsed the international standard
Nov. 12, 2010.125
While a systemic bank faces the possibility of various heightened
prudential standards at the behest of the Board of Governors, 126 each
foreign bank determined to be systemic will undergo annual stress tests
conducted by the Board of Governors 12' and be required to develop and
maintain "living wills." 128  The stress tests are meant to ensure that each
systemic institution has the total consolidated capital on hand to withstand
adverse market conditions and events.12 1 In addition to the stress tests
conducted by the Board of Governors, each systemic bank will be
required to conduct their own stress test on a semi-annual basis,' 30 and
submit the results to the Board of Governors Board and the bank's
respective primary federal regulator.13" '
The "living will" requirement is the second guaranteed requirement
placed upon a systemic bank by the FSOC.13 2 The living will is a rapid
dissolution plan created and maintained by the foreign bank and filed with
121 Leal Brainard, Under Secretary for International Affairs, Remarks at the Institute of International
Bankers' Breakfast, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY (Oct. 11, 2010) available at http'/www.amnericagov/st/texttrans-
english2010/October/20101012133926su8.553278e-02.htAl&distid=ucs ("The new Basel 1ll requirements
will be the bedrock of the new, more resilient global financial system, and America is committed to implement
Basel HU1").




125 Debbie Scanlon, G20 Endorses Basel HI Capital Standards, FINANCIAL REFORM INSIGHTS (Nov.
16,2010), http/fincialrefominsihts.conv2OlO/ll1/g20-endorses-basel-iii-capital-sandards/.
126 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (a)(1).
127 Id. S 5365(i)(1)(A).
128 Id. S 5365(b)(1)(A)(iv).
129 Id. S 5365(i)(1)(A).
130 Id. S 5365(i)(2)(A).
131 Id. S 5365(i)(2)(B).
132 Id. S 5365(d)(1).
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the FSOC, FDIC, and Board of Governors.33 Essentially a roadmap for
the dissolution of a firm seized by the government, the living will should
include: (1) information regarding the manner and extent to which any
insured depository institution affiliated with the company is adequately
protected from risks arising from the activities of any nonbanking
subsidiaries of the company;134 (2) full descriptions of the ownership
structure, assets, liabilities and contractual obligation of the company;'35
(3) identification of any cross-guarantees tied to different securities,
identification of major counterparties and a process for determining to
whom the collateral of the company is pledged'36 and (4) any other
information that the Board of Governors and the Corporation jointly
require by rule or order. 37 The information contained in the "living will"
must be approved by the Board of Governors and the FDIC and kept up
to date by periodic reporting by the bank.'38 A bank's failure to submit an
adequate "living will," according to accepted FSOC and Board of
Governors Standards, may result in implementation of increased
prudential requirements until submission of an acceptable "living will" is
tendered.'39 Failure to submit an adequate "living will" a second time may
result in forced divestiture of assets by command of the Board of
Governors. 40
In the event that a systemic firm has been identified as presenting a
grave threat-think Bear Stearns-the FSOC, upon a two-thirds vote may
authorize the Board of Governors to take aggressive steps to control the
impact of that firm's impact on the greater economy. 4' Those measures
include: (1) restrictions on the company's freedom to merge, acquire,
consolidate with or otherwise become affiliated with another company;'42
(2) limitations on the company's ability to offer certain financial
products;'43 (3) requirements that the company cease engaging in certain
activities'"; or (4) restrictions on the manner in which the company
133 Id. S 5365(d)(1).
134 Id. S 5365(d)(1)(A).
135 ld, S 5365(d)(1)(B).
136 Id. S 5365(d)(1)(C).
137 Id. §5365(d)(1)(D).
138 Id. S 5365(d)(3 ) .
139 Id. S 5365(d)(5)(A).
140 Id. S 5365(d)(5)(B).
141 Id. § 5331(a).
142 Id. § 5331(a)(1).
143 Id. S 5331 (a)(2).
144 Id, S 5331 (a)(3).
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engages in certain activities. 14 If the Board of Governors determines that
these measures are inadequate to confront the threat posed by the
troubled firm, the FSOC, upon a two thirds vote, may grant it the
authority to force the sale or transfer of assets off of its balance sheet.'
46
This authority is detailed below.
B. Title II: Orderly Liquidation Authority
Title II of the Act, dubbed the "Orderly Liquidation Authority"
(OLA), reserves for the FDIC the power to force covered financial
companies into receivership.'47 Although the Act will not change the
current regulatory reality for commercial banks, which were barred from
bankruptcy reorganization prior to adoption of Title II, the OIA expands
the reach of the FDIC power to all entities that qualify as "covered
financial companies." 148  The Act provides that the term "financial
company," as understood by the term "covered financial company,"
includes any company that is incorporated or organized under any
provision of Federal law or the laws of any State149 and; is a bank holding




148 Id. S 5381(a)(8) ("The term 'covered financial company' (A) means a financial company for which
a determination has been made under section 5383(b) of this tide; and (B) does not include an insured
depository institution."); see aLso S 5383(b) ("Determination by the Secretary Notwithstanding any other
provision of Federal or State law, the Secretary shall take action in accordance with section 5382(a)(1)(A) of
this tide, if, upon written recommendation under subsection (a), the Secretary (in consultation with the
President) determines that--) the financial company is in default or in danger of default; (2) the failure of
the financial company and its resolution under otherwise applicable Federal or State law would have serious
adverse effects on financial stability in the United States; (3) no viable private sector alternative is available to
prevent the default of the financial company, (4) any effect on the claims or interests of creditors,
counterparties, and shareholders of the financial company and other market participants as a result of actions
to be taken under this subchapter is appropriate, given the impact that any action taken under this subchapter
would have on financial stability in the United States; (5) any action under section 5384 of this title would
avoid or mitigate such adverse effects, taking into consideration the effectiveness of the action in mitigating
potential adverse effects on the financial system, the cost to the general fund of the Treasury, and the potential
to increase excessive risk taking on the part of creditors, counterparties, and shareholders in the financial
company, (6) a Federal regulatory agency has ordered the financial company to convert all of its convertible
debt instruments that are subject to the regulatory order, and (7) the company satisfies the definition of a
financial company under section 5381 of this tide."
149 Id. S 5381(a)(11)(A).
150 Id. S 5381(a)(11)(B)(i).
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Governors,' a company predominantly engaged in transactions which
are financial in nature15 or any subsidiary of any company described in
the foregoing categories.'53 A firm that falls within one of the "covered"
categories must first be designated a "systemic risk" to become subject to
the powers of the OLA.' 4 There are a number of regulatory procedural
hurdles, meant to protect due process rights, which must be overcome
prior to a final designation of systemic risk.
First, the financial entities primary regulator (in the case of foreign
banks the Board of Governors) must submit a written recommendation to
the Secretary of Treasury that the FDIC be appointed as the threatening
firm's receiver.55 The written recommendation is required to contain a
number of evaluations bearing on the appropriateness of the firm's
designation as a systemic risk and, thus, within the power of the OLA.
Those evaluations include: whether the firm is "in default or danger of
default,"'56 what effect such default will have on the greater U.S.
economy, whether private sector alternatives exist to the OLA of the
FDIC, an analysis of why the bankruptcy alternative is inappropriate, and
an evaluation of the effects of the default on the firm's creditors,
counterparties, and shareholders."5 7 The written recommendation is then
considered by the Secretary in concert with the President of the United
States. 58 In a marked shift away from bankruptcy procedure, it is possible
that the financial firm plays no role in the procedure to this point,
including implementation. 59 Upon approval of the recommendation and
a determination by the Secretary that no viable alternatives exist, the
Secretary will notify and seek the acquiescence of the board of directors of
151 Id. § 5381(a)(11)(B)(ii).
152 Id. § 5381(a)(11)(B)(iii).
153 Id. S 5381(a)(1 1)(B)(iv).
154 Id. S 5383.
155 Id. S 5383(a)(1)(A).
156 "In default or in danger of default" is a broad definition in the act, affording primary regulators a
fair amount of discretion in making determinations of'systemic' importance and 'covered' status. Specifically,
a financial company is in default or in danger of default if "a bankruptcy has been, or likely will be,
commenced with respect to the financial company, the financial company has incurred, or is likely to incur,
losses that will deplete all or substantially all of its capital and there is no reasonable prospect for the company
to avoid such depletion; the assets of the financial company are, or are likely to be, less than its obligations to
creditors and others; or the financial company is, or is likely to be, unable to pay its obligation (other than those
subject to a bona fide dispute in the ordinary course of business."). Id. S 5383(c)(4).
157 Id. S 5383(a)(2).
158 Id. 5383(b).
159 Id. § 5383.
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the financial firm to appoint the FDIC as receiver."6 If the board
acquiesces to the recommendation, the Act immunizes the directors from
liability from shareholders for such acquiescence. 6' A board's refusal to
acquiesce will force the Secretary to petition the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for an order authorizing the
appointment of the FDIC as receiver.
62
The firm's board may challenge the petition in the District Court, but
the court's review will be limited to the highly deferential "arbitrary and
capricious" standard." Moreover, a finding that the Secretary made the
determinations under review in an arbitrary and capricious manner simply
results in the court being forced to allow the Secretary to amend and re-
file the petition." If the District Court fails to render a decision on the
challenge to the Secretary's determination within twenty-four hours, the
Secretary's determination is automatically approved by operation of law. 65
Once the FDIC is appointed receiver, the procedure for liquidation
under the OLA provides notable variations from the reorganization
proceedings under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, where a debtor
remains in possession of the operation and the board and management
stay in place.'66 Under the OLA, the FDIC succeeds to all rights, titles,
powers, and privileges of the company and its assets, and of any
stockholder, member, officer, or director of the company.67 In effect, the
FDIC may exert control over the company with the authority of the
shareholder and board of directors in all of the company's affairs."6 The
extent of the grant of FDIC authority is exemplified by the FDIC's power
to transfer any asset or liability of the company without obtaining approval
or consent from any stakeholder. 69
160 Id. S 532(a)(1)(A)(i).
161 Id. S 5387.
162 Id. S 5382(a)(1)(A)(i).
163 Id. S 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii); see also C'tizens to Presenz Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971) ("Section 706(2)(A) requires a finding that the actual choice made was not 'arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' To make this finding the court must consider
whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error injudgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of
review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."
[citations omitted].
164 Id. S 5382(a)(1)(A)(iv)(I).
165 Id. 5382(a)(1)(A)(v).
166 11 U.S.C. S 363(b), 1107, 1108 (2010).
167 12 U.S.C. S 5390(a)(1)(A).
168 Id. S 5390(a)(1)(B).
169 Id. S 5390(a)(1)(G).
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Certain guiding principles, meant to inform the FDIC's actions once
appointed receiver of a covered financial entity, are included in Title 11.7
Among them, the mandate to conduct the liquidation in a manner which
maximizes returns while mitigating the risk presented to the U.S.
financial system.' The Act also establishes the priority of claims against
the liquidated firms, where the costs of the entities' liquidation come
second only to claims by secured creditors. 72 All claims owed to the
United States are next in line, followed by all other claims.'73
C. The Collins Amendment
The Collins Amendment affects a number of changes to the existing
capital regulatory regime for all bank and thrift holding companies.'74 The
Amendment disallows the use of hybrid capital instruments-most
notably trust preferred securities (TruPS)-to satisfy Tier 1 capital
requirements. 7' By express provision, the Collins Amendment applies to
banks organized in the United States but under the control of a foreign
parent. Thus, the Collins Amendment effectively obfuscates SR-01-1,176
which was an avenue to exemption from the Board of Governors Board's
capital requirements for bank holding companies controlled by non-U.S.
financial holding companies prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank 7
Compliance by systemic banks and banks with more than $15 billion in
capital will be expected by May 19, 2013.178
D. The Volcker Rule
Although subject to many exemptions, the Volcker rule against
proprietary securities trading by "banking entities" 179 is included in the Act
170 Id. § 5390(b).
171 Id. 5 5390(b)(4)(A)(i).
172 Id. § 5390(b)(1).
173 Id. S 5390(b)(1).
17 Id. § 5371(a)(3).
175 Erik Krusch, Dodd-Frank: TrPS Moing From Tier I to 2nd Rate, WESTLAW BUSINESS CURRENTS
(Sept 2, 2010), http/currents.westlawbusiness.conVArticle.aspx?id=64926116-9ad0-4079-b3e-
4blfc663a01f
176 12 U.S.C. S 5371(b)(4)(E).
IT7 Id.
178 Id. S 5371(b)(4).
179 The term 'banking entity' means any insured depository institution (as defined in section 3 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813)), any company that controls an insured depository institution,
or that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes of section 8of the International Banking Act of 1978,
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as an amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 19 56 ."s The Act
defines proprietary trading as:
engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking
entity or nonbank financial company supervised by the Board in
any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose
of, any security, any derivative, any contract of sale of a
commodity for future delivery, any option on any such security,
derivative, or contract, or any other security or financial
instrument that the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission may, by rule as provided in
subsection (b)(2), determine. 8'
The "trading account" consists of any account used for acquiring or taking
positions in covered instruments "principally for the purpose of selling in
the near term."'82 A number of exemptions are carved out from the Act
and are available to all banking entities including: transactions with
government or government entities; transactions which are incidental to
market making or underwriting provided such activity is for near term
demands of clients, customers and counterparties; risk-mitigating hedging
activities for a banking entity; and transactions in securities on behalf of
customers."s Other activity not covered by the Act includes transactions
occurring strictly outside of the United States"s and transactions by
insurance companies subject to equivalent regulatory coverage.18 5
In addition to the ban on proprietary trading within a bank, the
Volcker rule prohibits certain types of relationships and transactions
between banking entities and certain "covered" private equity or hedge
funds. 186 Covered funds are those that rely on Sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7)
and any affiliate or subsidiary of any such entity. Id. § 1851(h)(1).
180 Id.
181 Id. § 1851(h)(4).
182 Id. S 1851(h)(6).
183 Id. § 1851(d).
184 Id. S 1851(d)(1)(H) ("Proprietary trading conducted by a banking entity pursuant to paragraph (9)
or (13) of section 4(c), provided that the trading occurs solely outside of the United States and that the banking
entity is not directly or indirectly controlled by a banking entity that is organized under the laws of the United
States or of one or more States.").
1s5 Id. S 1851(h)(1)(F).
286 Id. S 1851(f); Id. S 1851(h)(2). ("Hedge Fund; Private Equity Fund-The terms 'hedge fund' and
'private equity fund' mean an issuer that would be an investment company as defined in the Investment
2011] DODD-FRANK SIMPLER
of the Investment Company Act of 1940.187 Banking entities are restricted
from either "sponsoring"' these covered funds or entering into a
transaction which is not exempt from 23A of the Board of Governors
Act,189 which was itself heavily amended by the Act.' 90
Despite inclusion of the Volcker rule, neither proprietary trading
activity, nor commingling of private equity/hedge funds with commercial
banks will cease entirely. The de minimus exemption allows for a banking
entity to invest up to three percent of its Tier 1 capital in a "covered fund,
"191 and can provide startup capital for a fund seeking unaffiliated
investors. 192  There is also a fiduciary exemption which requires
satisfaction of eight criteria,193 extension of the offshore exemption for
activities exclusively outside of the United States, a public welfare
exemption, and a delegation of authority to the Board of Governors to
create other exemptions they determine "would promote and protect the
safety and soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability of the
Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.) The Volcker rule applies to all "banking entities" and
transactions in any- security, derivative, or future, or option on any of the foregoing, or any other security or
financial instrument designated by the federal banking agencies, the SEC and the CFTC. The ban will not
extend to commodities, agricultural products or foreign exchange or loans, but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of
that Act, or such similar funds as the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Eachange
Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule, as provided in subsection
(b)(2), determine."
187 15 U.S.C. S 80a-3(c) ("Notwithstanding subsection (a), none of the following persons is an
investment company within the meaning of this title: (1) Any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than
short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and
does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities... (7) Any issuer, the outstanding
securities of which are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are
qualified purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that time propose to make a public offering of
such securities. Securities that are owned by persons who received the securities from a qualified purchaser as
a gift or bequest, or in a case in which the transfer was caused by legal separation, divorce, death, or other
involuntary event, shall be deemed to be owned by a qualified purchaser, subject to such rules, regulations,
and orders as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.").
188 12 U.S.C. S 1851(h)(5) ("The term to 'sponsor' a fund means--(A) to serve as a general
partner, managing member, or trustee of a fund; (B) in any manner to select or to control (or to have
employees, officers, or directors, or agents who constitute) a majority of the directors, trustees, or
management of a fund; or (C) to share with a fund, for corporate, marketing, promotional, or other
purposes, the same name or a variation of the same name.").
189 12 U.S.C. § 371c.
190 See HR. 4173 § 608,609.
191 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(4)(B)(ii)(l), (H).
192 Id. S 1851(d)(4)(A)(i).
193 Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(i)-(viii).
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United States."'94 Importantly, the Volcker Rule's exemptions are each
subject to interpretation by the "appropriate federal regulatory
agencies."' 95  This provision provides the Board of Governors the
authority to restrain the freedom of foreign entities to trade with
counterparties in the United States, or conduct transactions on U.S.
exchanges if such activity is determined by the Board to result in a conflict
of interest, exposure by the banking entity to high-risk trading strategies, a
threat to the safety and soundness of such banking entity or a threat to the
financial stability of the United States.
19 6
W. "Too BIG To FAIL" WAS Too BIG To KILL
Although the Dodd Frank reform will likely succeed in reducing
volatility in the financial markets temporarily, by forcing derivative and
swap instruments into clearinghouses and partially segregating activities
meant to ensure safety (saving) from those meant to ensure risk (trading),
it will fail to prevent the "too big to fail" market phenomenon. 197 As a
result, Dodd-Frank is contrary to good public policy. 98 Moreover, the
legislation delegates such unbridled authority to the financial regulatory
agencies in an effort to scare accountability into systemic banks, that it
may run afoul of the fundamental Constitutional principle of separation
of powers. 99 Each of these observations is addressed below.
A. The Simpler Solution
Titles I and II of Dodd-Frank address systemic risk, and reflect an
underlying assumption on behalf of the democratic Congress and
Administration that the existence of systemically threatening financial
firms is inevitable.200 Resultantly, the legislative response to the financial
194 Id. § 1851(d)(1)(j).
195 Id. 5 1851(d)(1).
196 Id- S 1851(d)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
197 Government Suppxt for US. Banks: Is It Really Over?, STANDARDANDPOORS.COM (July 13, 2011),
httpVideo.standardandpoors.com/?ideo=taFbSqFPkjcTYj7b3wGMQhOjET#.
198 Frederic S. Mishkin, How Big a Problem is Too Bg to Fai? A Review of Gary Stem and Ron Feldman's
"Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts," 44J. ECON. Lrr. 988,988- 92 (2006).
199 See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank and the Non-Ddegation Doarine, PROFESSOR
BAINBRIDGE.COM (July 16, 2010), http/v/www.professorbainbridge.con/professorbainbridgecom/
2010i07/doddfrank-and-the-nondelegation-doctrine.html (asserting that the Act's vast rulemaking raises the
spectre of non-delegation but conceding the unlikelihood the court would entertain that doctrine).
200 Paul Krugman, Too Big to Fail?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2010, 8:12 AM), http/knugmanblogs.
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crisis is not a forced break up of systemically threatening firms, but a
system of regulation which strives to increase transparency and
oversight.0 1 In the abstract, the financial regulations work to provide
regulatory helmsman with the data necessary to identify problematic
activity, and the tools to prevent that troubling activity from infecting the
larger financial marketplace.20 2 The theoretical underpinnings of this view
are frequently vocalized by economist Paul Krugman. 20 3 Krugman
subscribes to the Diamond-Dybvig 20 4 perspective on banking risk analysis,
where banks, acting without regulation, are inherently risky institutions
prone to periods of instability.205 From this theoretical foundation,
206Krugman presumes government intervention during a banking crisis.
In keeping with these views, Krugman advocates a comprehensive system
of banking regulation during normal economic conditions, "both to
reduce the need for rescues and to limit the moral hazard posed by the
rescues when they happen."207 Professor Krugman's most salient view is
that there is not enough correlation between "too big to fail" and bank size
to justify breaking the banks into smaller entities.208 In support of this
position, he points out that despite the major losses in mortgage backed
securities being concentrated in the largest banks, the smaller banks are set
to see even larger losses in commercial real estate.2z 9 Krugman argues
that the banks' leverage ratios, not their ultimate size, are what will best
protect the public from future bank bailouts.210
However, some prominent economists argue that Professor
Krugman's approach is only half correct. 211 These economists argue that
nytimes.conV2010i01/1 Vtoo-big-to-fail-fail-2/.
201 See 12 U.S.C. § 5321- 5374.
202 Id. §§ 5321- 5394.
203 See, e.g., Krugman, supra note 200.
204 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 3J. POL
ECON. 401 (1983), reptinted in 24 FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLS Q. REV. 14, 15 (2000), available at
http/minneapolisfed.org/research/Q/QR2412.pdf (describing banking model postulating that the
combination of long term maturity of assets and short term liabilities is inherently unstable and results in what
is termed a self-fulfilling run on the bank).







211 See Banking Industry Insiders Call for Beaking Up Giant Banks, WASHINGTON'S BLOG (Apr. 7,
2010), httpV/georgewashingtn2.blogsptcn/201(U4/banking-indusry-insiders-call-for.html.
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both a reduction in size and meaningful regulation of banking activities are
required to prevent financial institutions from reaching "too big to fail"
status.2 12 One of these economists, Simon Johnson, espouses a gloomy
forecast following the Dodd-Frank regulation-only approach. Johnson
argues that by allowing "too big to fail" institutions to exist, they will
invariably engage in high-risk, innovative behavior in the future, and that
the public will once more face a Hobson's Choice.213 This sentiment was
echoed by former Board of Governors Chairman, Alan Greenspan when
he stated, "[y]ou know, break them up . . . [i]n 1911, we broke up
Standard Oil. So what happened?" 214 Professor Johnson's conclusion is
to recommend hard caps on aggregate assets of four percent Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and two percent GDP for banks and
investment firms, respectively.215  According to his calculations, six
domestic firms would need to be broken up by the caps: Goldman Sachs,
JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, Wells Fargo & Co., and
Morgan Stanley.216 Johnson posits Dodd-Frank fails to effectively address
"too big to fail" by providing regulation, but failing to reduce bank size
because the legislation was captured 217 by the industry early in the
legislative process.
212 See Colin Barr, Let Big Banks Fail, Bailout Skeptics Say, CNN MONEY (Apr. 21, 2009, 1:22 PM),
httpV/money.cnn.corrv2D904/21/news/too.big.fortmne/mdexzhtm?postversion= 2 0 09 0 42 11 2 .
213 See Hobson's Choice, THEPHRASEFINDER.COM, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/
hobsons-choice.html for an explanation of what Simon Johnson refers to when he discusses what the
public may again face if too big to fail institutions are allowed to exist (A Hobson's choice is a free
choice in which only one option is offered. As a person may refuse to take that option, the choice is
therefore between taking the option or not; 'take it or leave it.' The phrase is said to originate from
Thomas Hobson (1544-1631), a livery stable owner at Cambridge, England. To rotate the use of his
horses he offered customers the choice of either taking the horse in the stall nearest the door or taking
none at all.).
214 Michael McKee & Scott Lanman, Greenspan Says U.S. Should Consider Breaking Up Large Banks,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2009, 10:50 P.M.), httpVAvww.bloomberg.com/apps/news;pid=
newsarchive&sid=aJ8HPmNUfchg.
215 Michael Corkey, Break Out the C-4: New Book Say Let's Blow Up Wall Street, WALL ST. J. BLOG
(Mar. 26, 2010, 3:19 PM), http/blogs.wsj.conm/deaL2010/03i26/break-out-the-c4-new-boook-say-lets-
blow-up-wall-street/.
216 See Sewell Chan, Financial Debate Renews Scrutiny on Banks' Size, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010,
http-/www.nytimes.con/2010/04/21/business/2lfail.html? =r 1.
217 For a discussion on what it means for the legislation to be captured, see Does Size Matter? Simon
Johnson vs. Paul Iugman on Whether to Break Up "Too Big to Fail" Banks, THE VIBE BOX (Apr. 12, 2010),
httpVthevibebocom/poitics/does-sie-matter-simon-johnson-vs-paul-krugrmn-on-whether-tc-break-up-
too-big-to-fail-banks/ [hereinafter "Does Size Matter] ("[Riegulatory capture' is the idea that there's tendency for
regulators to be captured by the very institutions that they're supposed to be regulating. New regulatory
legislation tends to start out with a big bang. But the details of regulation are complex and boring and within a
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The idea of agency and legislation capture by the banks fits neatly
within Johnson's broader perspective on the role of the modern U.S.
financial sector. Johnson takes the position that Wall Street has
entrenched itself in the United States as an oligarchic class.
218
Accordingly, Johnson asserts, the Wall Street banks accrue immense
political power incidental to their economic strength, and then use that
political influence to further entrench themselves in a position of
power.2 19 This "negative power loop" continually reinforces itself until,
ultimately, it is broken by an external force.220 Johnson analogizes the
scenario to the industrial trusts which had obtained such influence at the
turn of the twentieth century.221 They held tremendous influence over the
U.S. economy until President Theodore Roosevelt used antitrust laws to
break them apart.222
The Act's failure to force a downsizing of the major financial players
will only work to reinforce or actually create the negative power loop of
oligarchic banking institutions that Johnson argues already exist. 223 This
will be the inevitable result of the legislation erecting costs of entry
around the systemic banks in the form of reporting requirements and
assessments, while simultaneously discouraging competitors from
growing large enough to enter the systemic designation.224  By
discouraging firms from becoming systemic, the bill insulates the banking
entities already designated systemic from industry competition, lending
them a distinct market advantage to grow even larger.
few years, the public stops paying attention and the only ones paying attention are the civil servants paid to
implement the regulations and the institutions being regulated. Pressure for strong regulation diminishes. The
regulators increasingly come to identify with, or be intimidated by, the regulated institutions, particularly
when the regulators are earning government salaries and the regulated institutions employ Ivy League-
educated executives and lawyers making hundreds of thousands or millions of dollar a year. Experienced
regulators often leave the government and go to work for more money working for the institutions that they
formerly regulated, and don't want to alienate their potential future employers. And if a regulator does get too
aggressive, a top executive ofa TBTF institution like Jamie Dimon ofJP Morgan Chase or Lloyd Blankfein of
Goldman Sachs can always pick up the phone to a favorite Senator or Treasury Department official who will
in turn call the regulator's boss and tell them to back off.").
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Simultaneously, systemic firms regulated by the FSOC will attempt to
influence the rulemaking and policy decisions of the FSOC and its
member agencies. 25 Because systemic firms will have more routine
contact and interaction with each of these agencies, they will enjoy a
distinct advantage over their peers in this regard.226 The result is an anti-
market effect, where smaller firms will be assisted or disadvantaged
depending on whether their business model aligns with those systemic
firms which are able to exert their influence through the regulatory and
legislative state. Consequently, the legislation either creates or works to
institutionalize an acutely powerful, upper echelon in the American
financial system.
In addition to the inherent market corrupting effect of the Act, the
second failing of the Dodd-Frank approach is that it fails to account for
dangerous innovation in finance. Certainly, the financial crisis of 2008
made clear the threat posed by products that are kept off the balance sheet
and traded in the shadows away from public exchanges. Dodd-Frank, by
statutory decree, brings the swap market into the light but its drafters
cannot look into the legislative tea leaves to know in what form the next
threat comes. Invariably, market forces will encourage risk seekers -"too
big to fail" banks among them- toward a bastion free of Dodd-Frank,
where the return on investment is plentiful and transaction costs are
minimal. As an illustration, suppose the future holds the rise of digital
assets which have no physical form or intrinsic value. 27 Further suppose
that these assets surge in popularity over peer-to-peer networks because
their supply is limited by their originating algorithm and because they are
being traded peer-to-peer, no central authority can regulate them in any
meaningful way.228 Transaction costs are low as a result. The assets
z25 See, e.g., Lauren Tara LaCapra, Top Lobbying Banks Got Btest Bailout: Study, REUTERS (May 26,
2011, 3:25 P.M.), http.Avww.reuters.com/aricle=12/05/26/us-lbbying-imfreport-idUSTRE74P7AF
20110526 ("In an interview with Reuters on Thursday, Igan said her counterparts at the Board of Governors
have expressed concern to her that "some of the concepts would get watered down in the process because the
financial industry is lobbying hard against them.").
226 See Does Size Matter supra, note 217.
227 See, e.g., Chris Morris, Wat is Bitcoin? CNBC.COM (July 20, 2011 3:47 P.M.),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/43823614?par=yahoo ("Bitcoin is striving to be a global currency of sorts-
one that's not backed by any government or institution. Bitcoins aren't cash, technically. They're an
entirely virtual currency. Users exchange online credits for goods and services from select retailers,
contractors and online trading houses. Rather than going through a bank or financial institution, these
credits-called tokens by users-are exchanged directly from person to person. When a transaction
occurs, the bitcoin is automatically sent from the buyer to the seller through an encrypted method
that's designed to ensure bitcoins can't be hacked or artificially created.").
n8 Id.; see also Cameron Camp, Bitcoin: P2P Underground Cyber Currency?, ESET THREAT BLOG
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proliferate on the margins of what is considered mainstream finance and
secondary and tertiary investment vehicles develop in response to their
growth. Ultimately, systemic banks and brokerages are transacting digital
asset deals, presumably over heavily encrypted peer-to-peer networks,
aggregating in the trillions of dollars per year until a trojan horse, designed
to replicate the digital assets, activates and begins rapidly increasing the
supply of the digital assets leading to the destruction of their value.
Trading in the primary, secondary and tertiary investments ceases
immediately when news of the problem goes public and market-wide
panic grips the financial community. Once more, the government will
step in to bail out the systemic firms affected by this scenario because the
remaining participants simply will not have the capacity or the appetite to
absorb the billions of dollars in assets of the failing systemic firms. Dodd-
Frank seeks to resolve this by preventing the foregoing scenario from
affecting systemic firms. Incidentally, prevention requires a government
salaried regulator to have the willingness 9 and support' to quash highly
profitable activity being conducted by the most powerful financiers in the
(June 6, 2011, 11:27 P.M.), http://blog.eset.com/2011/06/06/bitcoin-p2p-underground-cyber-currency
("What remains to be seen is the regulatory stance if the value and popularity continues to rise. We
know in the U.S. the FBI has recently shutdown a ring of traditional currency being minted, traded
and circulated, citing a law prohibiting the creation of legal tender outside of the Federal Reserve.
Recently there has also been a rise in bitcoins being utilized in narcotic circles. There have been
numerous attempts by the recording industry to curb P2P music sharing, an activity that still thrives
despite myriad legal volleys. Will currency follow a similar P2P trajectory, or will fatal flaws in the
architecture stop it short? One thing to note, when the original Napster failed due to legal challenge,
dozens more popped up in its place, cementing P2P file sharing in the public mindset as a method of
private exchange which proved both valuable to many, and difficult to stymie.").
229 See Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Keynote Address and
Robert R. Glauber Lecture at the John F. Kennedy School of Government The Role of Government in
Markets (Oct 24, 2007) ("We've found that decentralized decision-making, in which millions of independent
economic actors make judgments using their own money, results in the wisest allocation of scarce resources
across our complex society. And we've found the market to be more reliable in heeding price signals and
meting out discipline to failing enterprises than government could ever be.").
2M Simon Johnson, The FDIC's Resolution Problem, THE BASELINE SCENARIO (April 28, 2011,
9:04 A.M.), http://baselinescenario.corm/2011/04/28/the-fdics-resolution-problem ("At the political
level, if you wish to engage in alternative or hypothetical history, you cannot ignore the presence of
Hank Paulson, then Secretary of the Treasury. Mr. Paulson steadfastly refused, even in the aftermath
of the near-collapse of Bear Steams, to take any proactive or preemptive role with regard to
strengthening the financial system - let alone intervening to break-up or otherwise deal firmly with a
potentially vulnerable large firm... In this respect Mr. Paulson was not an outlier relative to Tim
Geithner or other people who are likely to become Treasury Secretary. The operating philosophy of
the US government with regard to the financial sector remains: hands-off and in favor of intervention
only when absolutely necessary.").
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world armed, in all likelihood, only with an explanation that the activity
could lead to market instability. Given the history of regulatory deference
to profit seeking-despite enormous risk-- in this country, this plan rings
impracticable."3
A better approach would be to break apart the banks which currently
pose systemic threats, while tightening the regulatory fabric in a manner
which does not single out participants for particular treatment. 2  By
doing this, the threat posed by the future bad behavior of a major financial
firm is reduced incidental to the limitation on that firm's total assets.D3
The acknowledgement and institutionalization of "too big to fail" banks,
however, will lead to further perversion of incentive structures,
manipulated markets, and greater instances of moral hazard, requiring
public bailouts. 4 In addition to falling short on addressing the too big to
fail paradigm, Dodd-Frank may result in unconstitutional delegations of
power by overly aggrandizing the executive.
B. Article I Power Uncanalized
Congress' regulation-only approach may have delegated too much of
235its power to the Executive through the financial regulatory agencies.
Given the massive delegation of power -particularly to the Board of
Governors - resurrection of non-delegation does not seem fantastic or
inappropriate. 236 Considering that Dodd-Frank calls for the promulgation
of 250 new rules, which effectively shift the authority to create an entire
231 Id.
232 DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND
ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 150, (2010).
233 SeeJOHNSON &KWAKsupra note 43.
234 SKEEL, supra note 232 at 150.
235 Whitmanv. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,472 (2001) (internal citations omitted) ("Article I,
§1, of the Constitution vests '[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted ... in a Congress of the United States.'
This text permits no delegation of those powers, and so we repeatedly have said that when Congress confers
decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must 'lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.' We have never suggested that an agency
can cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the
statute.").
236 See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank and die Non-Delegation Doctrine,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 16, 2010 1:43 P.M.), httpV/www.professorbainbridge.conV
professorbainbridgecon2OlO/07/doddfrank-and-the-nondelegation-doctrine.html (asserting that Congress'
assignment of between 240 and 500 rule-makings to the administrative state is both a violation of the non-
delegation doctrine and better understood as Congress' abdication of its Constitutionally mandated duty.).
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body of new law to the executive, a recommitment to a doctrine rooted in
separation of powers seems imminently practical.737
The non-delegation doctrine has been used by the Supreme Court to
invalidate Congressional legislation very sparingly.238  The doctrine
developed as a tool to enforce the separation of powers critical to protect
the tripartite architecture enshrined in the United States Constitution. 239
Generally, non-delegation serves three purposes: it attempts to ensure that
important and difficult choices are made by Congress because it is the
branch of government most responsive to the popular will; it guarantees
that, to the extent possible, an "intelligible principle" guides the recipient
of the authority granted by Congress; and it ensures that a court reviewing
the exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able to test that
exercise against ascertainable standards.24°
In modern history, non-delegation challenges have succeeded only
twice to invalidate congressional legislation. 241  But more recently, the
doctrine has lurked just beneath the surface of the court's reasoning,
where it instead used its power of interpretation to limit the breadth of
delegation to an agency.242  In Industrial Union v. American Petroleum
Institute, the American Petroleum Institute challenged the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) interpretation of their
organic statute, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Health
Act).243 Under the Health Act, OSHA was chared with developing
standards to promote occupational safety and health. 44 Section 3(8) of the
Health Act defined "occupational safety and health standard" as one
"which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more
237 Id.
238 Id.; A.LA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
239 "That congress cannot delegate legislative power to the president is a principle universally
recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
constitution." Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,692 (1892).
240 Industrial Union Dep't. v. Am Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,685-86 (1980).
241 See A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
242 Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 646 ("If the Government was correct in arguing that neither § 3(8) nor
S 6(b)(5) requires that the risk from a toic substance be quantified sufficiently to enable the Secretary to
characterize it as significant in an understandable way, the statute would make such a 'sweeping delegation of
legislative power' that it might be unconstitutional under the Court's reasoning inALA Sdhedter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan. A construction of the statute that avoids this kind of open-
ended grant should certainly be favored.") (citations omitted).
243 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2011).
244 Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 691-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. S 652(8) (2011)).
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practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably necessary
or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment."
245
The issue in Industrial Union arose when the Secretary, in keeping
with the directive, promulgated a rule which set the exposure level to the
chemical Benzene at "the lowest technologically feasible level that will not
impair the viability of the industries regulated," or one part Benzene per
million air molecules.24 6 The regulated industries balked at the costs of
compliance with such standard and challenged the rule.
247
In a plurality decision, the Court interpreted the organic statute to
require that the Secretary identify a health risk that exists at a particular
threshold for a chemical substance, and then to decide whether to issue
the most protective standard as it had done, or issue a standard after
weighing its costs and benefits.248 By first determining that the Congress
would not have provided the Secretary with the broad latitude to
promulgate such a rule, three members of the plurality were able to avoid
non-delegation in favor of a statutory interpretation that was
constitutional.249 But Justice Rehnquist, in his concurrence, left no doubt
245 Id.
246 Section 6(b)5 of the statute provided the following guiding principle for promulgation of
rules under the title: "The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or
harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to
the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard
dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life. Development of standards under this
subsection shall be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as
may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection
for the employee, other considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the
feasibility of the standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws." Id. at
613 (majority opinion).
247 See id.
248 "If the Government was correct in arguing that neither S3(8) nor §6(b)(5) requires that the
risk from a toxic substance be quantified sufficiently to enable the Secretary to characterize it as
significant in an understandable way, the statute would make such a 'sweeping delegation of legislative
power' that it might be unconstitutional under the Court's reasoning in A.LA. Schecther and Panama
Refining." Id. at 644.
249 Justice Stevens proclaimed, "[iun the absence of a clear mandate in the Act, it is
unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to give the Secretary the unprecedented power over
American industry that would result from the Government's view of § 3(8) and 6(b)(5), coupled
with OSHA's cancer policy. Expert testimony that a substance is probably a human carcinogen-either
because it has caused cancer in animals or because individuals have contracted cancer following
extremely high exposures-would justify the conclusion that the substance poses some risk of serious
harm no matter how minute the exposure and no matter how many experts testified that they
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that he viewed the legislation to be a violation of non-delegation,
separation of powers, and an abdication of Congressional responsibility.250
Applying Industrial Union to Dodd-Frank, even prior to the
promulgation of a great many agency rules, delegation challenges appear
imminent. For example, with regard to the development of prudential
standards, Congress provides:
The Board of Governors may establish additional prudential
standards for nonbank financial companies supervised by the
Board of Governors and bank holding companies described in
subsection (a) that include . . . (vi) such other prudential
standards as the Board of Governors, on its own or pursuant to a
recommendation made by the Council in accordance with section
115, determines are appropriate.2
Although the provisions immediately preceding 165(b)(1)(B) specify
parameters for the implementation of the heightened prudential
standards, the language of 165(b)(1)(B) grants the Board of Governors a
blank check, effectively uncanalizing the power of Congress. These
regarded the risk as insignificant. That conclusion would in turn justify pervasive regulation limited
only by the constraint of feasibility. In light of the fact that there are literally thousands of substances
used in the workplace that have been identified as carcinogens or suspect carcinogens, the
Government's theory would give OSHA power to impose enormous costs that might produce little, if
any, discernible benefit." Id. at 634.
250 "As formulated and enforced by this Court, the nondelegation doctrine serves three
important functions... I believe the legislation at issue here fails on all three counts. The decision
whether the law of diminishing returns should have any place in the regulation of toxic substances is
quintessentially one of legislative policy. For Congress to pass that decision on to the Secretary in the
manner it did violates, in my mind, John Locke's caveat-reflected in the cases cited earlier in this
opinion-that legislatures are to make laws, not legislators. Nor, as I think the prior discussion amply
demonstrates, do the provisions at issue or their legislative history provide the Secretary with any
guidance that might lead him to his somewhat tentative conclusion that he must eliminate exposure to
benzene as far as technologically and economically possible. Finally, I would suggest that the standard
of "feasibility" renders meaningful judicial review impossible. We ought not to shy away from our
judicial duty to invalidate unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority solely out of concern
that we should thereby reinvigorate discredited constitutional doctrines of the pre-New Deal era. If
the nondelegation doctrine has fallen into the same desuetude as have substantive due process and
restrictive interpretations of the Commerce Clause, it is, as one writer has phrased it, "a case of death
by association." J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, A Theory ofJudicial Review 133 (1980). Indeed, a
number of observers have suggested that this Court should once more take up its burden of ensuring
that Congress does not unnecessarily delegate important choices of social policy to politically
unresponsive administrators." Id. at 686-87.
251 12U.S.C§5365(b)(1)(B) (2010).
252 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 19:219
"catch-all" provisions are necessitated by Congress' inability to predict
future innovation and its unwillingness to be held accountable for
authoring the laws which will almost certainly stifle profitable activity.252
However, the Constitution does not allow Congress to abdicate its duty
by delegating excesses of its power to an agency to create law.253
In addition to the catch-all provisions that are used throughout the
Act, Title II raises a host of Constitutional concerns besides non-
delegation, including presentment and due process. In addressing whether
a financial entity presents a systemic risk and requires dissolution, Section
203 of the Orderly Liquidation Authority vests the power to make that
determination entirely in the Executive and entirely in secret.2s4 Congress,
255through enumerated personnel and committee, preserves only the right
to notice of these actions within 24 hours after the decision to appoint the
FDIC as receiver has been made by the President and Secretary of
Treasury.216 Moreover, the Act does not require disclosure to the public
until 60 days after the FDIC has been appointed receiver.257 The secrecy
engendered in these provisions is clearly geared toward preventing bank
runs in the midst of crisis, but does so at the expense of shareholder due
process rights and the transparency necessary for markets to efficiently
operate. ss Aside from the obvious market meddling that results as
252 Bainbridge, supra note 199.
253 See generally, id.; Panama Refining v. Ryan, 293 U.S 388 (1935); ALA. Schechter Poultry
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); see also JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 141
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) ("The legislative cannot transfer the power of
making laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it
cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the common-wealth, which is
by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have
said, We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no body
else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but such as
are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them. The power of
the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no
other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make
legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in
other hands.").
254 See supra Part Ii.B.
255 § 5383(c)(2) ("Majority leader and Minority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker and Minority
Leader of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
Senate, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.").
256 Id. § 5383(c)(2).
257 Id. S 5383(c)(3)(A).
258 See, e.g., Joseph Gabai et al., United States: Dodd-Frank, Title II: Where the FDIC and the
"Orderly Liquidation Authority" Meet the Bankruptcy Code, MONDAQ.COM (Sept. 10, 2010),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid= 109616&tw=2 (advising clients that
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envisaged by the drafters, these provisions work to aggrandize the
Executive far beyond the limits of Constitutionality if non-delegation
retains any gravity.
V. CONCLUSION
The financial crisis of 2008 forces acknowledgement that meaningful
regulation of markets is required to prevent those who speculate and seek
short-term gains regardless of future costs from jeopardizing the stability
of the greater economy. What must also be acknowledged is that
regulation cannot remove risk from the marketplace without disrupting
markets. Somewhere between these known quantities, Congress must
find a legislative solution while remaining within the directives of the
Constitution. In its mixed ambition to solve the financial problems of
yesterday, today, and tomorrow, while remaining in the good graces of the
big banks, Congress simultaneously fell short and overshot its target. It
failed to end "too big to fail" by not breaking the banks and, in its effort to
avoid breaking the banks, likely ran afoul of the Constitutional principle
of separation of powers.
"[b]ased on the OLA's limited and expedited judicial review mechanism, parties transacting business
with a financial company should assume that any FDIC receivership appointment will stand, despite
the due process protections provided to the affected company to oppose such an appointment.");
Stephen J. Lubben, Some Powers for Dealing With Failed Financial Firms, NYTMES.coM (May 10, 2011
4:43 P.M.), httpV/dealbook.nytimes.coni/2011/05/10/some-powers-for-dealing-with-failed-financial-
firms/ ("While the bankruptcy code's approach is consistent with general notions of due process, the
liquidation authority approach probably better addresses the systemic nature of the problem."); see also
Harvey R. Miller & Maurice Horowitz, One Way That Dodd-Frank's Liquidation Authority Could Achieve
Parity With the Bankruptcy Code, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2010) (Noting that both
transparency and creditor rights are a general concern with FDIC receiverships and providing
examples which illustrate the point) http//www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Miller-and-
Horwitz-Liquidation-Authority.pdf.
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